The Supreme Court confirmed the constitutionality of the 1992 Haryana Amendment ("Amending Act") to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act. 1961, which vests land reserved for common purposes in the village Panchayat by applying a pro-rate cut.
The appeals filed by the State of Haryana and the Panchayats were allowed by a Bench comprised of Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian, who upheld the validity of the contested Amending Act on the grounds that it is part of agrarian reform and is protected under Article 31A of the Constitution. It was decided that the reserved land should be used by the Gram Panchayat for the current and future needs of the local community, and that no part of it could be divided among the landowners. It was clarified that the Amending Act simply gives the Panchayat management and control of the land. The Court further pointed out that invoking the Amending Act does not result in the acquisition of land and does not necessitate any compensation.
The Haryana Amendment to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, was challenged in 1992.
Background
The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the 1992 Haryana Amendments to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 ("1961 Act"). It overturned the amendments that had been proposed. The result was appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded the case because a vital finding was not recorded. The Full Bench dismissed the Review Petition after considering the constitutionality of the challenged section, Section 2(g) 6 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"2. Unless the context indicates otherwise, in this Act-
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(g) "shamilat deh" refers to
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(6) Lands set aside for village common purposes under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management and control of which is vested in the Gram Panchayat under Section 23-A of the same Act.
Explanation: Lands designated as 'Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad,' 'Jumla Malkan,' or 'Mushtarka Malkan' in the column of ownership of the register of rights shall be Shamilat Deh within the meaning of this Section."
The purpose of the modification was said to make the Act's provisions more effective, practical, deterrent, and favourable to the Gram Panchayat's interests.
In Punjab and Haryana, shamilat deh lands are common lands in villages that are reserved and used for communal reasons. The initial landowners were the agricultural tribes who cultivated and made the land cultivable, and they were known as khewatdar. They were the owners of land in a community as a group. The shamilat lands were shared by these khewatdars and the rest of the village's residents. The East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948 ("1984 Act") was enacted in 1948 to make agricultural holdings compulsory to consolidate and avoid fragmentation. The Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1949 were used to carry out the consolidation procedures. Following that, the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act of 1953 vested all private rights in shamilat deh lands in village panchayats. In Hukam Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 P&H 220, the P&H High Court ruled that it was unconstitutional. The 1953 Act, according to the High Court, is covered by Article 31-A of the Constitution since it provides for the extinction and modification of certain rights in certain village proprietors' property. In Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh (1985) 3 SCC 661, the Supreme Court considered the nature of shamilat lands (common lands). It was decided that the Act would be protected by Article 31A of the Constitution because it was a measure of agrarian reform. Following that came the 1961 Act, which gave the Gram Panchayats total ownership and title to the shamilat land.
The appellant's points of contention
Mr. Pradeep Kant, a senior advocate representing the State, argued that once land is set aside for a common purpose, it does not revert to the owners even if it is not used. The land does not have to be used within a specific timeframe, and the Gram Panchayat is free to use it for any common purpose at any time. It was argued that the Panchayat could lease out such land for the sake of a common good. He said that the contested Section 2(g)(6) was just a clarification. In the alternative, he argued that even if there was a provision to acquire land, it was an acquisition with 'Nil' recompense because the proprietors had already reaped the advantage of the consolidation programme.
Respondents brought up a number of issues.
Mr. Manoj Swarup, a senior advocate representing the proprietors, criticised the Amending Act, claiming that it gives the Panchayat rights and interests by vesting the land in it. He contended that this gives the Panchayat the authority to alienate the vested land. Anubha Agarwal, an advocate, contended that while the 1948 Act did not contemplate ownership transfer, the Amendment Act does, and without compensation, in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution. Another argument advanced by the proprietors' counsel was that the lands set aside for common use were never used for that purpose and were always with the proprietors, who are the owners of the land and cannot be deprived of their proprietary rights under the Amending Act. It was claimed that any surplus land that went unutilized would be reverted to the owners.
The Supreme Court's analysis
The Court stated that common land can be classed as - under Section 2(g)(1) and (6) of the 1961 Act as modified.
Prior to consolidation, a. shamilet deh was registered in the possession of the Gram Panchayat, which vests decisively with the start of the Punjab and PEPSU Act.
b. land for common purposes reserved during the consolidation process by taking a pro-rata cut from the owners' holdings, which may or may not fall below the allowed ceiling limitations under the land ceiling rules.
c. land set aside for common purposes on a pro-rata basis within the permissible limitations set by land ceiling regulations, with the panchayat in charge of management and control.
The Court found that the first category constituted part of agricultural reform, citing the P&H High Court's decision in Hukam Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 P&H 220 and the Apex Court's decision in Gram Panchayat of Village Jamalpur v. Malwinder Singh (1985) 3 SCC 661. According to the P&H High Court in Kishan Singh And Anr. v. State of Punjab And Ors. AIR 1961 P&H 1 and Jagat Singh And Ors. v. State of Punjab And Ors. AIR 1962 P&H 221 (FB), the land in the second category was also a part of the agrarian reforms protected by Article 31A of the Constitution, which was later affirmed by the Apex Court. The Court found - in the current appeals - that
"Thus, we determine that land of the second category, i.e., land earmarked for common purposes and not falling below the proprietor's ceiling limit, vests in the Panchayat." The Amending Act does not buy land or strip landowners of their ownership because such ownership had already been relinquished due to the consolidation scheme that set aside land for common purposes."
The Amending Act was found to be clarifying, and it was determined that Section 2(g)(6) of the 1961 Act, read with Section 4 of the 1961 Act, vests land reserved for common purposes in the village Panchayat by applying a pro-rate cut. It was also mentioned that the Amending Act, which was passed following the President's signature, was part of the agrarian reform. When the Amending Act was released, Article 31 was missing, hence there was no mechanism for compensation payment. Although Article 300 existed, it could not have been invoked simply by vesting land in a Panchayat.
The third category, according to the Court, was determined to be agrarian reforms by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab IRL (1996) 1 Punjab 828. On appeal, an Apex Court Constitution Bench concluded that the proprietor is not entitled to compensation because the proprietor's title is not being relinquished and administration and control are solely vested in the Panchayat. Because the Panchayat does not own the entire parcel of land, it will not be available for sale. It was clear that this would not be considered purchase under Article 31A's second proviso (1).
The land earmarked for common use cannot be re-partitioned on the basis that it was not put to common use within a specific period, according to a slew of decisions. It was held that the conserved land might be used for other common purposes than the one for which it was allocated, because common purpose is a dynamic manifestation.
The Haryana Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1999, as well as Sections 2(52A) and 161(1)(g) of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994, are being challenged.
The appellant's points of contention
Devadatt Kamat, a senior advocate, argued that the Amending Act of 1999 contained shamilat land, which it intended to vest in the municipality. He claimed that it was not agrarian reform and thus not covered by Article 31A of the Constitution. As a result, it is a purchase for which compensation should be given. According to Ms. Agarwal, the shamilat land is only for the benefit of the village's residents, and so its use cannot be expanded to neighbouring communities. Shamilat land is a rural idea that cannot be incorporated into city ordinances. Furthermore, transferring land to local organisations is not agricultural reform, and hence is not protected under Article 31A.
The respondent's points of contention
Mr. Pradeep Kant, a senior advocate for the State, contended that the land vested in the Panchayat will be transferred to the Municipal authorities under Section 4 of the 1961 Act, and hence the proprietors would not be entitled to compensation.
The Supreme Court's analysis
According to Section 7(4) of the Panchayati Raj Act, when a Panchayat territory falls within municipal boundaries, the Panchayat ceases to exist, and the land vests in the municipality and does not revert to the proprietor. Even if a portion of the Panchayat's land is included inside the municipal bounds, the 1973 Municipal Act states that it will vest in the municipality. The Court decided based on a consensual reading of the statutes that -
"If the entire or a portion of the Gram Panchayat territory is incorporated in the municipal limits, the land set aside for common purposes as part of the agrarian reforms will be vested in the municipality." This vesting will not be part of agrarian reforms, but will be due to the expansion of municipal boundaries."
Haryana is the name of the state in which the case is being heard. Jai Singh and Others v. Secretary to the Government of Haryana
Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 | 07 April 2022 Case No. and Date: Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 | 07 April 2022
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